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Abstract: A common presumption is that increased growth in the aggregate enhances the welfare 
of both the rich and the poor.  I show that instead, as the rich get richer, the welfare of the poor 
may decline if the underlying growth is asymmetric.  There are two distinct and complementary 
explanations:  First, sector-biased, skill-biased technological change, and second, efficiency 
improvements in the government sector. In the first case, skill-biased technological change in 
sectors consumed by the skilled rich increases their income beyond the increase in economic 
wealth, causing a decline in the consumption and welfare of the low-skilled poor.  This result 
stands in contrast to the standard model of skill-biased technological change.  In the second case, 
growth takes the form of improved efficiency in a government sector that is financed by rich 
taxpayers.  The welfare of the low-skilled poor will decline whenever the consumption bundle of 
the skilled rich embodies more skill intensity than does the production of government services.   
This analysis demonstrates that a rising tide need not lift all boats and that the exact nature of 
consumption patterns is important not only for growth and inequality, as has been emphasized in 
earlier literature, but also for welfare. 
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1. Introduction 
There is a growing consensus that new technologies complement skill, either directly or through 
productivity growth in the production of skill-complementing capital.  Models of skill-biased 
technological change and capital-skill complementarity offer explanations for the rising skill 
premium in the latter half of the twentieth century and predict that wage inequality is likely to 
continue to increase.  This paper expands these models to incorporate an additional insight, that 
new technologies appear to be directed not only toward factors of production (skilled labor), but 
also toward goods consumed predominantly by the rich.  The result of this asymmetric growth is 
a fall in the welfare of the low-skilled poor in addition to rising wage inequality.  This finding 
contrasts with the implications of the canonical one-sector model of skill-biased technological 
change, in which welfare increases despite rising wage inequality.1
 This insight also has important policy implications.  Welfare is inherently difficult to 
measure, but some evidence suggests that well-being of the least-skilled poor has in fact fallen or 
stagnated in the face of economic growth.  In the U.S., real GDP per capita increased 73% 
between 1970 and 2000, while the real wages of the lowest quintile earners decreased by over 
20%.  Likewise, Brazilian GDP per capita increased over 46% during the same period, yet the 
living conditions of the poorest residents have not improved.
    
2
 The analysis differs from earlier studies that have examined circumstances in which 
economic growth may reduce welfare.  Some notable examples include models of the Dutch 
Disease, as discussed in Corden and Neary (1982) and Krugman (1987), and of Immiserising 
Growth (see Baghwati 1958).  Both Dutch Disease and Immiserising Growth rely on specific 
circumstances that need not hold in general.  In contrast, the explanation I provide in this paper 
dispenses with these special conditions.  It is applicable to labor markets in a closed economy, 
but can also be reinterpreted to apply to a two-country international trade setting.  Furthermore, 
the model presented below directly addresses the “trickle down phenomenon” often heard in 
policy debates.  An extensive literature has documented the failure of U.S. economic growth to 
  Thus the “rising tide” of 
economic growth did not by necessity “lift all boats”, as JFK famously predicted in 1963.  My 
analysis provides a formal explanation of how the Poor’s welfare may fail to improve in the 
presence of aggregate economic growth even in advanced countries such as the United States. 
                                                 
1 See Acemoglu (1998, 2003) 
2According to the World Bank Development Research Group, in 2000, over 10% of the population continued to live 
on less than $1.25 a day.  
2 
 
“trickle down” to the lowest quintile of wage earners, but theoretical explanations to date remain 
inadequate.  Beaudry and Green (2003), for example, propose a model of organizational change 
that can generate falling real wages but relies on a counterfactual increase in the price of capital.  
In contrast to Beaudry and Green, in the model presented below the focus is explicitly on welfare 
rather than the real wage, and the welfare implications do not rely on any assumptions about the 
existence or price of capital.3
 The first part of this paper extends the one-sector, two-factor model in Acemoglu (1998) 
to an economy with two sectors (Yachts and Potatoes) and two agent types (Rich and Poor).
  Furthermore, the model with sector-specific, skill-biased 
technological change is consistent with some interesting features of the macroeconomy during 
the last half of the Twentieth Century, including 1) increasing expenditure shares of high-end 
services, 2) an increasing skill premium, 3) increasing skill intensity in high-end service sectors, 
and 4) a fall in the price of capital.    
4
 The assumption that technological growth been biased toward the goods the rich consume 
has some empirical support in the macroeconomic literature.   Buera and Kaboski (2009) 
document that as income has grown in the latter half of the twentieth century, there has been a 
substantial increase in the expenditure share of skill-intensive services such as finance, 
insurance, real estate, and architectural services.  I thus interpret Yachts to be skill intensive 
services.  Furthermore, Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) argue that the majority of TFP growth has 
  
The Rich agents own an endowment of high-skilled labor, while the Poor own an endowment of 
low-skilled labor. The key assumptions are, first, demand for Yachts is increasing in income; 
second, skill-biased technological improvements are sector specific; and third, the elasticity of 
substitution between high skilled labor and low skilled labor is greater than unity.  If technology 
improves in the Yacht sector, the wage of the skilled Rich increases. The Rich in turn use their 
increased income to demand more Yachts, which requires skilled labor to flow out of the Potato 
sector and into the Yacht sector. The result is a fall in the supply of Potatoes.  If preferences are 
strongly nonhomothetic such that the Poor consume only Potatoes, their welfare will decline.    
                                                 
3 Galor and Moav (2000)  also propose a model of ability-biased technological change that can account for rising 
wage inequality.  Their model generates a temporary fall in welfare for the low-skilled due to the assumption on the 
production function that technological progress erodes the weight given to unskilled labor. 
4 Appendix C extends the capital-skill complementarity model in Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000), 
which has three factors of production, and derives the same welfare implications.  This paper considers capital-skill 
complementarity to be consistent with skill-biased technological change and therefore refers to the two 
interchangeably.  In contrast to Beaudry and Green (2003), the results here are consistent with a fall in the price of 
capital over time. 
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been in the production of computers and IT, and Bosworth and Triplett (2000) show that the 
most intensive users of computer technology have included high-skill services such as finance, 
insurance, and communications.   
 This supporting empirical evidence is consistent with arguments in Acemoglu (1998, 
2003) that technological change responds to market forces.  As the rich demand more financial 
services, for example, the returns to the inputs in financial service production increase, which in 
turn increases the incentive to create software for the finance industry.  The implication of this 
form of asymmetric growth, according to the model presented below, is a bifurcation of the 
economy:  skilled labor flows from sectors consumed by the Poor to those consumed by Rich, 
depriving the Poor of goods and services. 
 This pattern of bifurcation may be most salient among goods or services within the same 
sector.  Broda and Romalis (2009) document that low-income households consume a basket of 
goods that is entirely different from the basket of high-income individuals, even though the 
goods are similarly classified.  Their evidence is based on scanner data for consumer goods such 
as Maxwell coffee and Starbucks, but I assume that a similar pattern holds for the nontraded 
service sector as well.  For example, low-income households use basic medical services at local 
clinics while the wealthy undergo plastic surgeries.  If we reinterpret Yachts to be high-end 
services such as cosmetic plastic surgeries, the model offers insights into the implications of a 
plastic surgeon’s office obtaining state-of-the-art operating equipment: Skilled nurses leave the 
clinic in the poor neighborhood to earn a higher wage at the plastic surgeon’s office in the 
wealthy neighborhood, driving up prices or reducing quality at the clinic. 
 This phenomenon also is consistent with the chronic underdevelopment of the poorest 
neighborhoods in America, South Africa, and elsewhere.  If technological improvements have 
been biased toward investments in products for the wealthy, skilled labor and capital will flow 
into the provision of goods and services for the wealthy, leaving fewer productive inputs to 
provide for the poor.  In the poorest neighborhoods, where goods and services are consumed 
exclusively by the low-skilled residents, only low-quality services provided by primarily low-
skilled workers will remain.  Imagine a state-of-the-art auto repair shop built near a gated 
community in Cape Town, South Africa.  Skilled mechanics will earn a high return using the 
new equipment, leaving the low-skilled auto workers to repair cars for the poor out of shacks in 
the townships.  Since the low-skilled mechanics work with inferior capital equipment their 
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marginal product remains low, as does their income.  Low income implies that demand for goods 
and services in low-income neighborhoods remains insufficient to attract new investments that 
would, in turn, increase wages and wealth.  
 Sector-specific, skill-biased technological change is not the only source of asymmetric 
growth that has implications for income, demand patterns, and welfare.  The second part of the 
paper examines another type of asymmetric growth in the form of improved efficiency in a 
government sector that is financed exclusively by taxes on the wealthy.  This model is 
complementary to the earlier model in that either channel could be in operation without the other, 
or both channels could be active.  The purpose of the second model is to understand the 
implications of tax cuts at the upper end of the income distribution.  For tractability, I focus on a 
model in which the government balances its budget every period. I assume that government 
services do not enter agents’ utility functions, and that an exogenous level of government 
services is necessary.  The government sector could represent military or defense services, for 
example.  As the threat to national security falls, so does government spending, rendering the 
provision of security by the government more efficient in the sense that it can provide the same 
level of security at a lower cost.  An alternative interpretation of this model of the government 
sector is simply spending on wasteful political projects.  Government efficiency improves when 
wasteful projects are eliminated, leaving only necessary services (such as food inspection or 
defense) to be financed by taxes on the skilled Rich.   
With the inclusion of the government sector, the “rising tide” takes the form of improved 
government efficiency.  As government efficiency improves, the tax burden of the Rich falls and 
their wealth increases.  If the consumption bundle of the Rich embodies more skill intensity than 
does the production of government services, the welfare of the low-skilled Poor will decline.  As 
in the first model with sector-biased, skill-biased technological change, the wealth transfer to the 
Rich is greater than the increase in private economic wealth; the Poor are worse off as a result.  
In contrast to the model of sector-biased, skill-biased technological change, in the model with the 
government sector the direction of the welfare change for the Poor depends on sectoral 
differences in skill intensities rather than input elasticities of substitution.  Furthermore, the 
model with the government sector does not require that the Rich and the Poor consume different 
bundles of goods for the Poor to be worse off.  However, the welfare decline for the Poor will be 
greater when the consumption bundles differ such that consumption of the Rich embodies more 
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skill intensity.  In other words, even if the Rich use more low-skilled cleaning services, the 
welfare decline of the poor can be substantial if the Rich disproportionately hire skilled architects 
in addition to low-skilled cleaning services.   
One implication of this model is that government waste is actually beneficial to the Poor 
when the production of goods consumed by the Rich is skill intensive relative to production in 
the government sector.  Furthermore, taxes are important for more than their ability to pay for 
government services or to redistribute income:  There are secondary effects on demand patterns 
that feed back into production decisions, the distribution of income, and welfare.  In the 
calibrated baseline model the effects are admittedly small because the sectors within the 
government that are low-skill intensive are a small share of the whole economy.  Therefore 
efficiency improvements in these sectors have a small wealth effect on the Rich (and in turn a 
small welfare impact on the Poor).  Despite these small calibrated effects, the intuition from the 
model has implications for a more realistic setting in which tax cuts for the high-income coincide 
with budget deficits rather than efficiency improvements in the government sector:  Tax cuts 
increase the disposable income of the skilled Rich, increasing the demand for high-end goods 
and services, which has an immediate effect on the supply of low-end goods and services 
available to the Poor.  Although I do not explicitly incorporate endogenous technology, dynamic 
effects may operate as well.  The arguments in Acemoglu (1998, 2003) imply that technology 
should flow to the high-end sectors as demand for these products increases.  If this endogenous 
technology response is skill-biased (as in Section 3), then the welfare decrease for the Poor may 
be persistent and self-reinforcing in the absence of countervailing forces in the economy (such as 
Hicks-neutral growth and technology spillovers).   
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reports the evidence that 
technological improvements have been biased toward goods predominantly consumed by the 
wealthy.  Section 3 details the baseline model and illustrates the welfare effects of sector-specific 
skill-biased technological change.  Section 4 incorporates a Government sector to demonstrate 
the welfare effects of falling tax rates due to the end of a tax-financed war.  Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Macroeconomic Evidence of Sector-Biased Technological Change 
A near consensus has emerged that U.S. economic growth, especially in the 1990s, has primarily 
been due to productivity growth in the production and the use of information technology (IT) 
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equipment.5
 Triplett and Bosworth (2000) note that IT use has, indeed, been concentrated in a handful 
of industries.   The 1992 capital flow tables show that five industries (financial services, 
wholesale trade, business services, insurance, and communications) alone accounted for over 
half of new purchases of computers.  If the measure of IT includes communications equipment in 
addition to computers and peripheral equipment, the air transportation industry also is included 
as a primary user of IT.  The pattern based on the 1997 capital flow table is remarkably similar:  
At a more aggregated industry level, the three primary users of computers, software, and 
communications equipment are information, finance and insurance, and professional and 
technical services. 
  To the extent that IT use is unevenly distributed across sectors, technological 
progress will be asymmetric.  The questions we address in this section are first, whether there has 
been substantial asymmetry in the use of IT equipment (and therefore economic growth), and 
second, whether this asymmetry is related to consumption demand patterns. 
 Of the IT-intensive industries mentioned above, four can be linked to NIPA consumption 
categories:  finance, insurance, professional services, and air transportation.  The expenditure 
share of each of these categories has increased in the latter part of the Twentieth Century; their 
combined share increased by over 57% between 1970 and 2000.    As Buera and Kaboski (2009) 
document, each of these is a relatively skill-intensive service industry, and consumption 
categories that experienced increasing expenditure shares are almost exclusively skill-intensive 
services.  Other categories, such as food, clothing, and low-skill services have fallen or stagnated 
as a share of personal consumption expenditures.  I interpret this evidence as indicative of 
nonhomothetic preferences:  As income rises, demand shifts toward skill-intensive services, 
including those that are the most intensive users of IT.6
 In this paper I therefore interpret evidence of productivity growth in the use and 
production of IT capital as technological change that is biased toward goods consumed by the 
Rich.  Technological change is also assumed to be skill-biased based on the overwhelming 
evidence in support of skill-biased technological change (including capital-skill 
   
                                                 
5 See Stiroh (2002), Jorgensen (2001), Jorgensen and Stiroh (2000) 
6 The fact that the services demanded by the Rich are be skill-intensive is irrelevant for the substantive results 
presented in Section 3 when there is sector-biased, skill-biased technological change.  However, the skill intensity of 
the consumption bundle of the Rich will be important in the model with a government sector (Section 4). 
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complementarity) in the latter part of the Twentieth Century.7
  
  Section 3 models skill-biased 
technological change in the simplest form by allowing IT technology to augment skill in 
production functions with two factors (skilled and unskilled labor).  Appendix C treats IT 
equipment as an additional factor in production functions in which IT capital and skill are 
relative complements. 
3.    Baseline Model 
The baseline model consists of two factors (high-skilled labor 𝐻 and low-skilled labor 𝐿), two 
agent types (Rich and Poor), and two goods (Yachts and Potatoes) in a static economy.  𝐻 Rich 
agents each inelastically supply one unit of high-skilled labor and 𝐿 Poor agents each supply a 
unit of low-skilled labor.   Here technology is taken as exogenous, and all markets are 
competitive.   
 
3.1 Consumer Preferences 
Rich (R) and Poor (P) consumers have identical nonhomothetic preferences over Yachts and 
Potatoes of the form 
𝑈𝑖(𝐹𝑖,𝑌𝑖) = max(𝑎 × 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐹𝑖 + 𝑏) ,𝑌𝑖) 
where 𝑖 ∈ 𝑅,𝑃 and 𝑌𝑖 is consumption of Yachts by consumer type 𝑖.  We use 𝐹𝑖 to denote 
consumption of Potatoes by consumer 𝑖 (𝑃 already refers to Poor agents). This form of 
preferences has the useful property that consumption switches from exclusively Potatoes to 
exclusively Yachts as wealth crosses a certain threshold determined by the scale parameters 𝑎 
and 𝑏. 8
                                                 
7 See, for example, Bound and Johnson (1992), Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003), and Autor, Katz, and Kearney 
(2008) 
  It captures the fact documented in Broda and Romalis (2009) that low-income 
households consume a basket of goods that is entirely different from the basket of high-income 
individuals, even though the goods may be similarly classified.   For example, the Rich consume 
high-quality Starbucks coffee while the Poor consume Maxwell instant coffee.  The evidence in 
Broda and Romalis is based primarily on scanner data and applies mainly to different brands of 
8 A more common form of preferences in the structural change literature takes the form   
 𝑈𝑖(𝐹𝑖,𝑌𝑖) = � 𝐹𝑖  𝑖𝑓 𝐹𝑖 < 𝐹�𝐹� + 𝑌𝑖  𝑖𝑓 𝐹𝑖 > 𝐹�   , in which the wealthy consume both Potatoes and Yachts but only once they’ve 
satiated their demand for Potatoes.  The welfare implications are robust to this form of preferences, but they are 
analytically inconvenient. 
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goods within a sector, but we make the additional assumption that the Yacht bundle includes 
skill-intensive service sectors that are not included in the Potato bundle, such as financial 
planning services and architectural services.  Since the skill-intensive services have experienced 
the majority of technological improvements in the form of IT use, we will assume that 
technological growth occurs primarily in the yacht sector (see section 3.4). 
An interesting quality of the consumer preferences is that if the wealth of the Poor were 
to increase, they would initially consume more Maxwell coffee and Mickey’s Malt Liquor 
(referred to collectively as Potatoes).  At some point their wealth may be high enough that they 
instead purchase fine wines, airline tickets, and financial services (Yachts).  I assume that 
endowments and technologies are such that the low-skilled Poor remain low-income and thus 
consume only Potatoes, while the high-skilled rich consume only Yachts. We can thus rewrite 
preferences as  
𝑈𝑅(∙) = 𝑌𝑅        𝑈𝑃(∙) = 𝑎 × log(𝐹𝑃 + 𝑏). 
 If the Rich were handed a Potato, it would not increase their utility.  This seems 
reasonable; wealthy households likely have little use for malt liquor since it would take up 
cabinet space reserved for higher quality alcoholic beverages.  Similarly, if the Poor were handed 
a Yacht their utility would not increase.   This is clearly a less palpable assumption but may be 
appropriate in some contexts.  If the low-income poor were given a claim on architectural 
services they could not use it without owning a home (which they may not be able to afford).  
Rather than actually use the service they would exchange it for a good or service that will 
provide them with utility. 
 
3.2 Production 
Potatoes (𝐹) and Yachts (𝑌) are competitively produced with a constant-returns-to-scale 
technology using high-skilled labor and low-skilled labor:   
𝐹 = 𝐹(𝑧𝐹𝐻𝐹 , 𝐿𝐹) 
and    𝑌 = 𝑌(𝑧𝑌𝐻𝑌,𝐿𝑌) 
where 𝐻𝑗 and 𝐿𝑗 are high-skilled labor and low-skilled labor employed in sector 𝑗 ∈ 𝐹,𝑌 and 𝑧𝑗 is 
the skill-augmenting technology parameter in sector 𝑗.  Here we assume that production has the 
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same constant elasticity of substitution (CES) functional form as the models in Acemoglu 
(1998,2003): 
𝐹 = �𝜂(𝑧𝐹𝐻𝐹)𝜎𝐹−1𝜎𝐹 + (1 − 𝜂)𝐿𝐹𝜎𝐹−1𝜎𝐹 � 𝜎𝐹𝜎𝐹−1 
and 
   𝑌 = �𝜇(𝑧𝑌𝐻𝑌)𝜎𝑌−1𝜎𝑌 + (1 − 𝜇)𝐿𝑌 𝜎𝑌−1𝜎𝑌 � 𝜎𝑌𝜎𝑌−1. 
Appendix B examines equilibrium effects when production functional forms are not specified, 
and Appendix C incorporates IT capital into a nested CES functional form similar to that used in 
Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000).   
 
3.3 Equilibrium and the Effects of Asymmetric Growth 
In the static competitive equilibrium consumers maximize utility subject to their budget 
constraints; firms maximize profits, and labor markets clear. The 𝐻 Rich agents’ collective 
budget constraint is  
𝐻𝑤𝐻 ≥ 𝐹𝑅𝑝𝑅 + 𝑌𝑅𝑝𝑌 
 where 𝑤𝐻 is the wage for high-skilled labor, 𝑝𝑗 is the price of good 𝑗, and 𝑗𝑅 is consumption of 
good 𝑗 by Rich agents.  Since endowments and technology are such that the Rich have enough 
wealth to exclusively purchase Yachts, their budget constraint can be written as 
𝐻𝑤𝐻 ≥ 𝑌𝑝𝑌. 
Furthermore, since production is competitive and exhibits constant returns to scale, 𝑝𝑌 will equal 
the cost-minimizing bundle of inputs necessary to produce one Yacht.  Thus 
𝑌𝑝𝑌 = 𝐻𝑌𝑤𝐻 + 𝐿𝑌𝑤𝐿 
and we can rewrite a representative Rich agent’s problem as  
max  �𝜇(𝑧𝑌𝐻𝑌)𝜎𝑌−1𝜎𝑌 + (1 − 𝜇)𝐿𝑌 𝜎𝑌−1𝜎𝑌 � 𝜎𝑌𝜎𝑌−1 s.t.      𝐻𝑤𝐻 ≥ 𝐻𝑌𝑤𝐻 + 𝐿𝑌𝑤𝐿 . (1) 
 
Likewise, the representative Poor agent’s problem is  
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max   . 5 × log��𝜂(𝑧𝐹𝐻𝐹)𝜎𝐹−1𝜎𝐹 + (1 − 𝜂)𝐿𝐹𝜎𝐹−1𝜎𝐹 � 𝜎𝐹𝜎𝐹−1� 
s.t.       𝐿𝑤𝐿 ≥ 𝐻𝐹𝑤𝐻 + 𝐿𝐹𝑤𝐿 . (2)  
Viewing the consumers’ problem as a choice over consumption of the two labor types is helpful 
for understanding the comparative static effects of an increase in 𝑧𝑌, which in equilibrium will 
depend on the substitution elasticities 𝜎𝑌 and 𝜎𝐹.  Equilibrium is fully characterized by the 
budget constraints (equations (1) and (2)), utility maximization by the Rich: 
𝑤𝐻
𝑤𝐿
= 𝜇1 − 𝜇 𝑧𝑌𝜎𝑌−1𝜎𝑌 �𝐿𝑌𝐾𝑌� 1𝜎𝑌 , (3) 
 
utility maximization by the Poor: 
𝑤𝐻
𝑤𝐿
= 𝜂1 − 𝜂 𝑧𝐹𝜎𝐹−1𝜎𝐹 �𝐿𝐹𝐾𝐹� 1𝜎𝐹 , (4) 
 
and market clearing: 
𝐿𝐹 + 𝐿𝑌 = 𝐿, (5) 
𝐻𝐹 + 𝐻𝑌 = 𝐻. (6) 
As noted above, technological improvements have been biased toward high-end services, which 
are modeled here as Yachts.  Therefore the object of interest is skill-biased technology in the 
Yacht sector, 𝑧𝑌. 
 
Proposition 1:    If high-skill labor and low-skilled labor are substitutes in the production of 
Yachts (𝜎𝑌 > 1), then an increase in skill biased technology in the Yacht sector (𝑧𝑌) will cause a 
decrease in the amount of Potatoes produced and therefore a decline the welfare of the Poor.  If 
labor types are substitutes in the production of Potatoes (𝜎𝐹 > 1) the decline will be due to an 
outflow of high-skill labor from the Potato sector to the Yacht sector.  If labor types are 
complements (𝜎𝐹 < 1) in the production of Potatoes the decline will be due to an outflow of both 
inputs from the Potato sector. 
Proof: See Appendix A.   
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The empirically relevant case is when labor types are substitutes (𝜎𝑌 > 1 and 𝜎𝐹 > 1), 
although the crucial assumption for a fall in the welfare of the Poor is simply 𝜎𝑌 > 1.  An 
increase in 𝑧𝑌 drives up the wage premium, increasing the income of the Rich.  Rich agents use 
their income to effectively purchase bundles of high-skill labor and low-skill labor.  Since the 
𝑧𝑌𝐻𝑌 bundle is a substitute for 𝐿𝑌 in the Rich’s utility function, the increase in 𝑧𝑌 increases 
𝑧𝑌𝐻𝑌, causing the Rich to desire a substitution of 𝐻𝑌 for 𝐿𝑌.  Since the increase in 𝑧𝑌 also 
increases the return to skilled labor and therefore the wealth of the Rich, the Rich are able to 
meet their desire for more skilled labor by purchasing skilled labor from the Poor.  Skilled labor 
therefore flows from the Poor to the Rich (from the Potato sector to the Yacht sector).   
The effect on the allocation of low-skilled labor, 𝐿, depends on the elasticity of 
substitution in the Potato sector.  If 𝜎𝐹 < 1, labor types are complements for the Poor and the 𝑧𝑌-
induced decline in 𝐻𝐹 lowers the value of 𝐿𝐹, which in turn diminishes the income of the Poor 
relative to the income of the Rich.  In this case, the Rich have enough wealth to purchase more 
low-skilled labor in addition to high-skilled labor.  If 𝜎𝐹 > 1, which is likely the empirically 
relevant case, the outflow of 𝐻 from the Poor’s consumption bundle causes a desire to substitute 
𝐿 for 𝐻, which increases the value of 𝐿 relative to the case of complements.  The Poor then are 
able to retain enough wealth to purchase low-skilled labor from the consumption bundle of the 
Rich. 
When inputs are substitutes in each sector, the net effect is a fall in the utility of the Poor.  
This is because the effect of the outflow of high-skilled labor from the Potato sector outweighs 
the effect of the inflow of low-skilled labor (see Appendix A).   Figure 1 illustrates the net effect 
of an increase in 𝑧 using an Edgeworth Box in which the representative agents trade high-skilled 
labor and low-skilled labor.  The isoutility lines are identical to isoquants in the production of 
Potatoes for the Poor and Yachts for the Rich. Note that the original endowment of (𝐿,𝐻) to the 
Rich is (0,1). Figure 1 decomposes the change in allocations into what are labeled a substitution 
effect and an income effect.  The substitution effect is defined as the change in allocations 
induced by an increase in 𝑧𝑌 when the economy’s endowment point is assumed to be the original 
equilibrium (rather than (0,1)).  The remaining distance from the original equilibrium to the 
actual new equilibrium is the income effect.   
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Figure 1: Edgeworth Box Representation of an Increase in 𝑧. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The ratio of H to L is the same as the skill ratio in 2000 where high-skilled labor equals hours worked 
by college graduates.  The exogenous increase in technology is fourfold to illustrate the effects.   
 
The key point in Figure 1 is that the income effect, rather than the substitution effect, 
drives down the utility of the Poor.  In fact, the substitution effect places both the Poor and the 
Rich on a slightly higher isoutility line. The income effect captures the fact the Rich are endowed 
with high-skilled labor, which has increased in value.  The Rich are able to use their increased 
wealth to purchase additional skilled labor for the production of Yachts.   
An alternative way to understand the mechanism driving down the welfare of the Poor is 
through prices.  If we normalize the price of low-skilled labor to unity, then the price of a Potato 
is  
𝑝𝐹 = �𝜂𝜎𝐹 �𝑤𝐻𝑧𝐹 �1−𝜎𝐹 + (1 − 𝜂)𝜎𝐹� 11−𝜎𝐹 
and the price of a Yacht is 
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𝑝𝑌 = �𝜇𝜎𝑌 �𝑤𝐻𝑧𝑌 �1−𝜎𝑌 + (1 − 𝜇)𝜎𝑌� 11−𝜎𝑌 . 
When 𝑧𝑌 increases the marginal product of skilled labor increases, driving up 𝑤𝐻.  The price of 
Yachts falls because the increase in 𝑧𝑌 is greater than the increase in 𝑤𝐻 (𝑑𝑤𝐻/𝑑𝑧 < 1).  
Potatoes, meanwhile, do not benefit from price-reducing technological change, and thus the price 
of Potatoes increases because of the increase in 𝑤𝐻.  Therefore the Poor do not benefit from 
higher wages but must pay a higher price for their consumption good.   
The Poor would benefit if technological change augments either factor in the Potato 
sector or augments low-skilled labor in the Yacht sector.  For example, technological change 
biased toward low-skilled labor in the Yacht sector pulls down 𝑤𝐻 and the price of Potatoes 
relative to the return on low-skilled labor, thus improving the welfare of the Poor.  The Poor 
likewise benefit from skill-biased technological change in the Potato sector:  An increase in 𝑧𝐹 
increases 𝑤𝐻 relative to 𝑤𝐿, but the overall effect is a fall in the price of Potatoes. 
The greater is the elasticity of substitution in the Yacht sector, the greater is the 
consumption loss for the Poor in response to an increase in 𝑧𝑌.  Define 𝐹� = 𝑑𝐹/𝐹 and     
?̂?𝑌 = 𝑑𝑧𝑌/𝑧𝑌 .  Then total differentiation of equations 1 through 6 yields the response of Potato 
production to a small change in skill-biased technology in the Yacht sector: 
𝐹�  = −𝐹− 𝛽𝛽−1 � 𝜎𝑌𝐻𝑌𝐿(𝜎𝑌 − 1)(1 − 𝜂)𝐿𝐹− 1𝜎𝐹𝐿𝑌(𝜎𝐹𝐻𝐹 + 𝜎𝑌𝐻𝑌)  𝐿𝐹 (𝜎𝑌  − 1) + (𝜎𝐹𝐿𝐹 + 𝜎𝑌𝐿𝑌)(𝐻𝐹 + 𝜎𝑌𝐻𝑌)� × ?̂?𝑌, 
the magnitude of which is increasing in 𝜎𝑌 when 𝜎𝑌 > 1.  Most estimates of the elasticity of 
substitution between skilled labor and low-skilled labor are between 1.4 and 2, implying that an 
increase in skill-biased technology in the Yacht sector drives down the supply of Potatoes.9
 
  Note 
that the direction of the change in the supply of Potatoes does not depend on factor intensities in 
the two sectors.   
3.4 Calibration 
 To get a sense of the magnitude of the consumption loss for the Poor we calibrate the model by 
choosing 𝜎𝑌 = 𝜎𝐹 = 1.4, which is at the lower end of the empirical estimates of the elasticity of 
                                                 
9 See Katz and Murphy (1992), Angrist (1995), and Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000). 
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substitution between skilled and low-skilled labor.  We set the skill ratio, 𝐻
𝐿
,  equal to 0.7, which 
is close to the 2000 relative supply in Buera and Kaboski (2009) and the 1996 relative supply in 
Acemoglu (2002).  The starting values for 𝑧𝑌 and 𝑧𝐹 are equal to one.  Finally, we choose  
𝜂 = 𝜇 = 0.62 to match the wage premium in 2000, which is approximately 2.1 (see Acemoglu 
and Autor 2010).  With these parameter values, a percent increase in 𝑧 from a starting value of 1 
causes a change in the supply of Potatoes of  -0.1%.   
Acemoglu (2002) postulates that skill biased technology increased almost tenfold in the 
U.S. between 1970 and 1990, based on a one-sector model with an elasticity of substitution equal 
to 1.4.  The model here shows that if the full extent of technological improvements had been 
specific to sectors exclusively consumed by wealthy college graduates, the consumption loss for 
low-skilled workers would have been around a magnitude of 22% in the absence of hicks-neutral 
technological improvements, increases in the relative supply of high-skilled labor, technology 
spillovers, and other sources of economic growth.   
The assumption that technological improvements are confined to the Yacht sector is 
illustrative but not realistic.  If technological improvements occur in both sectors, the net effect 
on the supply of Potatoes will depend on the relative magnitude of skill-biased technological 
change in the Yacht sector.  Table 1 shows different combinations of increases in 𝑧𝑌 and 𝑧𝐹 that 
achieve the same increase in the wage premium, along with the percent change in Potatoes per 
low-skilled worker.  With an elasticity of substitution equal to 1.4 in both sectors, an 85% 
increase in 𝑧𝑌 requires a 13% increase in 𝑧𝐹 to ensure that the supply of Potatoes does not fall.  
When the elasticity is 2, a 75% increase in 𝑧𝑌 will depress the Poor’s consumption of Potatoes 
even if 𝑧𝐹 increases by 22%.  When growth is more symmetric, the consumption and welfare of 
the Poor improves.   
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Table 1: Response of Consumption of the Poor to Skill Biased Technological 
Improvements 
 𝜎𝑌 = 𝜎𝐹 = 1.4 
 
  𝜎𝑌 = 𝜎𝐹 = 2 
Increase 
in 𝑧𝑌 
 
Increase 
in 𝑧𝐹 
 
Change 
in F 
 
Increase 
in 𝑧𝑌 
 
Increase 
in 𝑧𝐹 
 
Change 
in F 
100% 
 
0% 
 
-7.0% 
 
100% 
 
0% 
 
-11.0% 
95% 
 
4% 
 
-4.8% 
 
95% 
 
4% 
 
-9.1% 
90% 
 
8% 
 
-2.6% 
 
90% 
 
8% 
 
-7.3% 
85% 
 
13% 
 
0.0% 
 
85% 
 
12% 
 
-5.4% 
80% 
 
18% 
 
2.6% 
 
80% 
 
17% 
 
-3.0% 
75% 
 
24% 
 
5.7% 
 
75% 
 
22% 
 
-0.7% 
70% 
 
29% 
 
8.3% 
 
70% 
 
28% 
 
2.1% 
65% 
 
36% 
 
11.9% 
 
65% 
 
34% 
 
4.9% 
60%   43%   15.4%   60%   41%   8.2% 
Note: Each row generates an equivalent increase in the skill premium for a given value 
of the elasticity of substitution. 
 
As in the canonical one-sector model in Acemoglu (1998), inequality increases in all 
cases.  For example, when 𝑧𝑌 doubles the skill premium increases by 23.5%.  Furthermore, the 
expenditure share of Yachts increases by over 15%.  The model therefore matches both the 
increasing trend in the skill premium and the trend documented in Buera and Kaboski (2009) of 
an increasing expenditure share of high-end services over time.    Finally, the model predicts that 
the skill intensity of the Yacht sector should increase in response to the increase in 𝑧𝑌 due to the 
inflow of skilled labor.  This is exactly the pattern observed in the high-end sectors mentioned in 
Section 2.  Between 1940 and 2000, the average skill intensity over all sectors increased almost 
70%, while the average skill intensity in the high-end service sectors increased over 250%.10
 
    
4. Government Spending and Welfare 
The previous section examined growth in the form of sector-specific, skill-biased technological 
change.  Here we examine growth in the form of increased government efficiency.  As in the 
previous model, economic growth will depress the welfare of the low-skilled poor because the 
wealth increase of the skilled Rich is greater than the increase in private economic wealth.  
Unlike the model above, the welfare decline does not rely on differential consumption patterns 
                                                 
10 Based on IPUMS data used in Buera and Kaboski (2009).  The high-end industries include Security and 
commodity brokerage and investment companies, Banking and credit, Legal services, Engineering and architectural 
services, Real estate, Insurance, and Air transportation. 
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between the Rich and the Poor. However, the magnitude of the decline will be greater if the 
consumption of the Rich embodies more skill intensity than the consumption bundle of the Poor.  
Rather than define efficiency to be output per units of input, in which case “government 
efficiency” may strike readers as a bit of an oxymoron, I define improvements in government 
efficiency as a lower necessary level of government spending on anything over which agents do 
not derive utility.  Spending on war is the clearest example: War may be necessary for security, 
but citizens are assumed to not care about wars for their own sake. As threats to national security 
decline, so can war spending, freeing resources for use in the private sector.   
 If we model war as the production and destruction of tanks by the government, then one 
would expect that less tank production should be welfare-improving. The model below shows 
that it is not welfare-improving for low-skilled workers when certain assumptions hold.  
Specifically, the model imposes a progressive tax system in which only skilled workers pay 
taxes.  If a war ends (fewer tanks are produced and destroyed), the savings are passed on to the 
tax-paying skilled who then demand more private sector goods and services.  If the consumption 
bundle of the skilled workers embodies more skill intensity than the war production function, the 
wages and welfare of the low-skilled will fall.  The mechanism is similar to that in Section 3:  
The income increase for the skilled Rich is greater than the increase in economic wealth 
available for private consumption, allowing the Rich to purchase productive resources that would 
otherwise have been purchased by the Poor. 
 
4.1 Model 
𝐻 skilled Rich agents and 𝐿 low-skilled Poor agents have identical, nonhomothetic preferences 
over Potatoes (F) and Yachts (Y).  Consumer preferences are identical to those in section 3, and 
we again assume that the income of Poor agents is low enough that they consume only Potatoes, 
while the Rich agents consume only Yachts.  Reduced form preferences are therefore 
𝑈𝑅(∙) = 𝑌𝑅        𝑈𝑃(∙) = 𝑎 × log(𝐹𝑃 + 𝑏). 
Yachts and Potatoes are again produced with a constant returns technology over high-skilled 
labor and low-skilled labor, although here we assume a general functional form and ignore the 
effects of factor-augmenting technology: 
𝐹 = 𝐹(𝐻𝐹, 𝐿𝐹) 
and 
17 
 
   𝑌 = 𝑌(𝐻𝑌,𝐿𝑌). 
We introduce a government sector, which also takes high-skilled labor and low-skilled 
labor as inputs in a constant-returns-to-scale production function: 
𝐺 = 𝐺(𝐻𝐺 , 𝐿𝐺). 
Agents do not derive utility from the government sector.  Instead, we assume an exogenously 
given level of necessary government services ?̅? that is financed by taxes on the skilled Rich:   
𝜏𝑤𝐻𝐻 = 𝑝𝐺?̅?, 
where 𝜏 is the income tax rate on the Rich and 𝑝𝐺 is the price of government services. 
 
4.2 Equilibrium 
The representative skilled Rich agent’s budget constraint is  (1 − 𝜏)𝑤𝐻𝐻 = 𝑝𝑌𝑌𝑅 ,         
which we can rewrite as  
𝑤𝐻𝐻 = 𝑝𝑌𝑌 + 𝑝𝐺?̅? (7) 
The low-skilled Poor agent’s budget constraint is 
𝑤𝐿𝐿 = 𝑝𝐹𝐹 (8) 
The remaining equations that characterize the static competitive equilibrium are cost 
minimization in the three sectors, 
𝑐𝑌(𝑤𝐻,𝑤𝐿) = 𝑝𝑌, (9) 
𝑐𝐹(𝑤𝐻,𝑤𝐿) = 𝑝𝐹 , (10) 
𝑐𝐺(𝑤𝐻,𝑤𝐿) = 𝑝𝐺 , (11) 
market clearing conditions, 
𝐻𝑌 + 𝐻𝐹 + 𝐻𝐺 = 𝐻, (12) 
𝐿𝑌 + 𝐿𝐹 + 𝐿𝐺 = 𝐿, (13) 
and factor demands given by Shepard’s Lemma: 
𝜕𝑐𝑌
𝜕𝑤𝐻
= 𝐻𝑌
𝑌
 (14) 
𝜕𝑐𝑌
𝜕𝑤𝐿
= 𝐿𝑌
𝑌
 (15) 
𝜕𝑐𝐹
𝜕𝑤𝐻
= 𝐻𝐹
𝐹
 (16) 
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𝜕𝑐𝐹
𝜕𝑤𝐿
= 𝐿𝐹
𝐹
 (17) 
𝜕𝑐𝐺
𝜕𝑤𝐻
= 𝐻𝐺
?̅?
 (18) 
𝜕𝑐𝐺
𝜕𝑤𝐿
= 𝐿𝐺
?̅?
. (19) 
Note that the cost function for sector 𝑌 is 
𝑐𝑌(𝑤𝐻,𝑤𝐿) = min{𝑤𝐻𝐻𝑌 + 𝑤𝐿𝐿𝑌 ∶  𝑌(𝐻𝑌, 𝐿𝑌) = 1}, 
and the cost functions for sectors 𝐹 and 𝐺 are similarly defined.  
For any variable 𝑥, define 𝑥� = 𝑑𝑥/𝑥.  Then log-linearizing equations (7) through (19) 
gives the responses of endogenous variables to a change in ?̅?: 
𝑤𝐻� = 𝑠𝑌(𝑌� + 𝑝𝑌 � ) + 𝑠𝐺(?̅?� + 𝑝𝐺�) (20) 
𝑤𝐿� = 𝐹� + 𝑝𝐹� (21) 
𝜃𝐻𝑤𝐻� + 𝜃𝐿𝑤𝐿� = 𝑝𝑌� (22) 
𝜙𝐻𝑤𝐻� + 𝜙𝐿𝑤𝐿� = 𝑝𝐹� (23) 
𝜓𝐻𝑤𝐻� + 𝜓𝐿𝑤𝐿� = 𝑝𝐺� (24) 
𝜆𝐻𝑌𝐻𝑌� + 𝜆𝐻𝐹𝐻𝐹� + 𝜆𝐻𝐺𝐻𝐺� = 0 (25) 
𝜆𝐿𝑌𝐿𝑌� + 𝜆𝐿𝐹𝐿𝐹� + 𝜆𝐿𝐺𝐿𝐺� = 0 (26) 
𝐻𝑌� = 𝑌� + 𝜃𝐻𝜎𝑌(𝑤𝐿� −𝑤𝐻� ) (27) 
𝐿𝑌� = 𝑌� + 𝜃𝐿𝜎𝑌(𝑤𝐻� −𝑤𝐿�) (28) 
𝐻𝐹� = 𝐹� + 𝜙𝐻𝜎𝐹(𝑤𝐿� −𝑤𝐻� ) (29) 
𝐿𝐹� = 𝐹� + 𝜙𝐿𝜎𝐹(𝑤𝐻� −𝑤𝐿�) (30) 
𝐻𝐺� = ?̅?� + 𝜓𝐻𝜎𝐺(𝑤𝐿� −𝑤𝐻� ) (31) 
𝐿𝐺� = ?̅?� + 𝜓𝐿𝜎𝐺(𝑤𝐻� −𝑤𝐿�) (32) 
We denote cost shares of labor in the Potato sector as 𝜙𝐻 ≡ 𝑤𝐻𝐻𝐹/𝐹𝑝𝐹 and 𝜙𝐿 ≡ 𝑤𝐿𝐿𝐹/𝐹𝑝𝐹.  
Cost shares in the Yacht sector (𝜃𝐻 and 𝜃𝐿) and in the Government sector (𝜓𝐻 and 𝜓𝐿) are 
similarly defined.  The shares of labor types in each sector 𝑗 ∈ {𝑌,𝐹,𝐺} are 𝜆𝐻𝑗 = 𝐻𝑗𝐻  and 
𝜆𝐿𝑗 = 𝐿𝑗𝐿 .  The cost shares of each good in the Rich agent’s budget constraint are 𝑠𝑌 = 𝑌𝑝𝑌𝑌𝑝𝑌+?̅?𝑝𝐺 
and 𝑠𝐺 = ?̅?𝑝𝐺𝑌𝑝𝑌+?̅?𝑝𝐺.  As in section 2, 𝜎𝑗 is the elasticity of substitution in sector 𝑗.  
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 We can normalize 𝑤𝐿 = 1 so that 𝑤𝐿� = 0.  Then the above system of equations has 
thirteen equations and twelve unknowns.  By Walras’ Law, one of the equations is redundant, so 
we will choose to ignore equation (1).  The remaining system of equations is  
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
0 0 −1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
𝜃𝐻 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
𝜙𝐻 0 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
𝜓𝐻 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 𝜆𝐻𝐶 0 𝜆𝐻𝑌 0 𝜆𝐻𝐺 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 𝜆𝐿𝐶 0 𝜆𝐿𝑌 0 𝜆𝐿𝐺
−𝜃𝐻𝜎𝐶 0 0 0 1 0 −1 0 0 0 0 0
𝜃𝐿𝜎𝐶 0 0 0 1 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0
−𝜙𝐻𝜎𝑌 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 −1 0 0 0
𝜙𝐿𝜎𝑌 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 −1 0 0
𝜓𝐻𝜎𝐺 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
𝜓𝐿𝜎𝐺 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1⎦⎥⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
𝑤𝐻�
𝑝𝑌�
𝑝𝐹�
𝑝𝐺�
𝑌�
𝐹�
𝐻𝑌�
𝐿𝑌�
𝐻𝐹�
𝐿𝐹�
𝐻𝐺�
𝐿𝐺� ⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
=
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
00000000001
−1⎦⎥⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
?̅?�. 
The Poor’s welfare is monotonically increasing in the production of Potatoes, 𝐹.  Therefore the 
variable of interest is 𝐹�, which has a simple relationship with the change in the wage premium, 
𝑤𝐻� , given by  
𝐹� = −𝜙𝐻𝑤𝐻� . (33) 
The above equation derives from the Poor’s budget constraint and cost minimization in the 
Potato sector.  As the price of skilled labor increases, so does the price of Potatoes, which drives 
down the purchasing power of the Poor.  Therefore to understand the effects of changes in the 
size of the government sector on the welfare of the Poor, we only need to determine its effects on 
the price of skilled labor.   
The relationship between the change in the skilled wage and the change in government 
production is  
𝑤ℎ� = �𝜆𝐻𝐺𝜆𝐿𝑌 − 𝜆𝐿𝐺𝜆𝐻𝑌�𝜆𝐿𝐺𝜆𝐻𝑌𝜓𝐿𝜎𝐺 + 𝜆𝐻𝐺𝜆𝐿𝑌𝜓𝐻𝜎𝐺 + 𝜆𝐿𝐹𝜆𝐻𝑌[𝜙𝐿𝜎𝐹 + 𝜙𝐻] + 𝜆𝐿𝑌�𝜆𝐻𝑌𝜎𝑌 − 𝜆𝐻𝐹𝜙𝐻(1 − 𝜎𝐹)� 𝐺�. 
The denominator is positive whenever σF ≥ 1, which we again assume here.  Then the skilled 
wage will be inversely related to the size of the government sector whenever λLGλHY > λHGλLY, 
which is equivalent to HY
LY
> HG
LG
.  This condition states that whenever the yacht sector is more skill 
intensive than the government sector, a decrease in the size of the government sector will drive 
20 
 
up the skilled wage and drive down the welfare of the Poor.  The mechanism is straightforward: 
Lowering ?̅? allows the Rich to use their income to purchase Yachts instead of government 
services.  If Yachts are relatively skill-intensive, the demand for skilled labor increases, pushing 
up the skilled wage.  The increase in 𝑤𝐻 pushes up the price of Potatoes relative to 𝑤𝐿, which 
diminishes the purchasing power of the low-skilled Poor.  The effect of the increase in 𝑤𝐻 on the 
fall in the consumption of the Poor is more intense the larger is the cost share of skilled labor in 
the Potato sector. 
 An increase in ?̅? has the opposite effect:  if the government hires primarily low-skill 
workers for any task, however useless, the welfare of all low-skill workers will increase.  One 
implication is that wasteful pork projects may be beneficial to all low skill workers, not just 
those directly employed by the projects.  If low-skilled labor is mobile, the government-induced 
demand for low-skilled workers will drive up their wage while the skilled Rich foot the bill.   
 
4.3 Calibration 
To get a sense for the sensitivity of wages and welfare to changes in the government sector, we 
treat the government sector as the Armed Forces, the size of which increases during times of war 
and decreases during times of peace.  For example, in 2001 approximately 0.5% of workers were 
in the Armed Forces, while in 2008 over 0.8% of workers were in the Armed Forces, an increase 
that we attribute to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  In this section we will approximate the 
wage and welfare consequences of an end to these wars and a 50% reduction in the size of the 
Armed Forces.  
 The following calculations are based on American Community Survey data provided by 
the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS).  Skilled workers are defined as those who 
have completed four or more years of college.  In 2008, the skill ratio, 𝐻
𝐿
, was . 43 and the skill 
premium, 𝑤𝐻
𝑤𝐿
, was 2.14. The proportion of skilled workers in the Armed Forces, 𝜆𝐻𝐺 , was 0.0065 
and the proportion of low-skilled workers in the Armed Forces, 𝜆𝐿𝐺, was .009.  To get a lower 
bound for the magnitude of the effect of changes in government size on wages and welfare, we 
first assume that the Yacht and Potato sectors have the same skill intensity (in which case the 
model above is equivalent to a model with only one consumption sector).  Table 2 shows the 
implied parameter values.  A one percent decrease in the size of the Armed Forces will increase 
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the wage premium by 0.0028% and decrease low-skilled workers’ consumption by 0.0014%.  If 
the Armed Forces are halved to just below their 2001 size, low-skilled workers’ consumption 
will fall by around 0.07%. 
 These magnitudes increase when we allow the skill intensities in the Yacht and Potato 
sectors to differ.  Although there is no direct data on the embodied skill intensity of the 
consumption bundle of the Rich, we can place an upper bound based on the skill intensities in the 
service sectors mentioned in Section 2.  The most skill intensive industry, “Security and 
Commodity Brokerage and Investment Companies”, has a skill ratio of 0.66. We therefore 
conservatively set 𝐻𝑌
𝐿𝑌
 to 0.6 and assume that the Yacht sector uses half of the total supply of 
high-skilled labor.  Table 1 shows the resulting parameter values and the sensitivity of 𝑤𝐻�  to ?̅?�:  
A percent decrease in ?̅? increases the wage premium by 0.0028% and decreases the size of the 
Potato sector by 0.007%.  If ?̅? is halved, the wage premium will increase by around 1.0% and the 
consumption of Potatoes by the Poor will decline by around 0.36%. 
  
Table 2:  Parameter Values and Effects of a Change in the Size of the Government Sector 
 𝜆𝐻𝑌  𝜆𝐻𝐹  𝜆𝐻𝐺  𝜆𝐿𝑌  𝜆𝐿𝐹  𝜆𝐿𝐺 𝜙𝐻 𝜓𝐻 𝑤𝐻� /𝐺� 𝐹�/𝐺� 
Lower 
Bound 0.497 0.497 0.007 0.496 0.496 0.009 0.48 0.42 -0.0028 0.0014 
Upper 
Bound 0.500 0.494 0.007 0.214 0.846 0.009 0.35 0.40 -0.0206 0.0072 
Note: Bounds for the response of F to a change in G are based on varying  𝜆𝐿𝑌 so that the ratio of skilled labor 
to unskilled labor in the Yacht sector is 0.43 for the lower bound and 0.6 for the upper bound. 
 
In the example above the Government sector is small relative to the rest of the economy.  
If the Government sector is initially large and intensive in low-skill workers, the welfare loss 
from a decrease in ?̅? will be even more substantial.  The effects will have the opposite sign when 
the government sector is skill intensive relative to the Yacht sector.  
   
5. Conclusion 
Rich individuals consume a bundle of goods and services that is different from the bundle of 
their Poor counterparts.  Some goods and services may be higher quality versions of the same 
item (see Bils and Klenow (2001) and Broda and Romalis (2009)), while other services are 
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exclusive to the consumption bundles of the wealthy.  The exact nature of consumption patterns 
is important not only for growth and inequality patterns, as has been emphasized in the earlier 
literature, but also for welfare. 
As the Rich get richer, productive resources are increasingly devoted to the production of 
goods and services demanded by the Rich.  If the source of the income increase of the Rich is 
asymmetric growth, their welfare increase may come at the expense of the welfare of the Poor.  
This is because the Rich’s increased income allows them to consume bundles of productive 
resources that would otherwise have been purchased by the Poor.  If the Rich’s income increase 
is higher than the increase in economic wealth, the Poor not only fail to benefit from the growth, 
but they are actually worse off.  Inequality increases and welfare falls. 
 This paper illustrated this mechanism through asymmetric growth of two forms:  first, 
sector-biased, skill-biased technological change, and second, efficiency improvements in the 
government sector (or less government waste).  In the first case, the welfare decline of the low-
skilled Poor is greater the more biased is growth toward high-end goods and services.  The 
welfare loss is also greater the less important are high-end goods and services in the consumption 
bundle of the Poor. In the extreme, the Poor do not consume any goods that experience 
productivity gains, and their consumption/welfare loss is substantial.   
 In related work, Murphy, Schleifer, and Vinshy (1989), Zweimuller (2000), Matsuyama 
(2000), Matsuyama (2002), and Buera and Kaboski (2009) examine growth patterns in 
economies with heterogeneous agents that have nonhomothetic preferences.  Here I assumed a 
similar economic environment, but focused specifically on growth in the form of skill-biased 
technological change.  My analysis therefore provides a link between the structural change 
literature and the models of skill-biased technological change in Acemoglu (1998, 2003).  As in 
Baumol (1967) the technological change is assumed to be sector-specific.  I demonstrated that 
Baumol’s cost disease, combined with the additional assumption of differential consumption by 
heterogeneous agents, not only increases the price of skilled labor, but also reduces the welfare 
of the Poor. 
The second form of asymmetric growth modeled in this paper is a decline in government 
waste under a progressive tax system.   In this scenario, a more efficient government depresses 
the welfare of the Poor whenever the consumption bundle of the Rich embodies more skill-
intensity than the production of government services.  This is true even if the consumption 
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bundles of the Poor and the Rich are the same.  However, the effect is stronger when the bundle 
consumed by the Rich embodies higher-than-average skill intensity.  Thus the end of a tax-
financed war which employed low-skilled soldiers will hurt other low-skill workers most when 
the skilled Rich use their tax savings to purchase architectural, financial, and other skill-intensive 
services.11
Evidence suggests that sector-biased, skill-biased technological change is important at the 
sector level:  Productivity growth in the US in the latter part of the Twentieth Century was 
primarily confined to the use and production of IT capital.
   
12   The sectors that use the majority of 
IT capital are skill-intensive services that have upward-sloping Engel curves, including financial 
services, insurance, professional services, and air transportation.   The increase in productivity in 
the production or use of IT employed in these industries actually deprives other sectors that cater 
to the Poor of resources, lowering their supply and expenditure share over time.  Thus sector-
biased, skill-biased technological change offers an explanation for the increasing expenditure 
shares of skill-intensive services in the latter part of the Twentieth Century.13
 The focus of this paper is on illustrating mechanisms rather than on developing methods 
to test these models empirically.  A rigorous empirical test of the model would require matching 
consumption of disaggregated goods and services to the inputs used in production of the specific 
goods and services. Existing data clearly are inadequate for such an analysis.  The development 
of suitable datasets for testing this proposition is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 Skill-biased 
technological change in service sectors demanded by the skilled Rich increases the expenditure 
share of skill-intensive services and lowers the shares of other sectors. 
 An interesting avenue for empirical research would be to document productivity gains 
and the adoption of IT by service establishments at the neighborhood level.  The differential 
nature of consumption between services in high-income and low-income neighborhoods is 
perhaps the starkest implication of the models presented in this paper when applied to the U.S. 
economy. If service establishments in high-income neighborhoods experience skill-biased 
                                                 
11 This model is similar to the 2-factor, 2-sector setup in Naito (1999), which extends the Harbinger (1962) model to 
show that under a nonlinear income tax system inefficiencies in the government sector can Pareto-improve welfare 
by relaxing the skilled agents’ incentive compatibility constraint.   
12 See Stiroh (2002), Jorgensen (2001), Jorgensen and Stiroh (2000) 
13 Buera and Kaboski (2009) propose an additional/alternative explanation for the rise of the service economy based 
on the substitution of market production of services for home production of services in response to economic 
growth.  Ngai and Pissarides(2007) demonstrate that balanced growth is possible when technological change is 
sector-biased. 
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technology improvements or utilize more IT capital than their counterparts in low-income areas, 
then the model in this paper may help explain the chronic underdevelopment of some of the 
poorest neighborhoods.   
  
  
  
25 
 
References 
Acemoglu, D. (1998) “Why do New Technologies Complement Skills?  Directed Technical 
  Change and Wage Inequality.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 111:779-804. 
 
Acemoglu, D. (2003) “Patterns of Skill Premia,” Review of Economic Studies 69:781-809. 
 
Acemoglu, D. and D. Autor (2010) “Skills, Tasks and Technologies: Implications for 
 Employment and Earnings.” NBER Working Paper 16082. 
 
Angrist, J. (1995) “The Economic Returns to Schooling in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.” 
 American Economic Review, 85(5): 1065-1087. 
 
Autor, D., L. Katz, and M. Kearney (2008) “Trends in U.S. Wage Inequality: Revising the 
 Revisionists.” Review of Economic Statistics 90(2): 300-323. 
 
Autor, D., F. Levy, and R. Murnane (2003) “The Skill Content of Recent Technological Change: 
  An Empirical Investigation.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 118: 1279–1333. 
 
Baumol, W. J. (1967) “Macroeconomics of Unbalanced Growth: The Anatomy of Urban  Crisis." 
 American Economic Review, 57 (3), 415-426. 
 
Bhagwati, J. (1958) "Immiserizing Growth: A Geometrical Note," Review of Economic Studies 
 25: 201-205. 
 
Beaudry, P. and D. Green (2003) “Wages and Employment in the United States and Germany: 
 What Explains the Differences?” American Economic Review, 93(3): 573–602. 
 
Bils, M. and P. Klenow (2001) “Quantifying Economic Growth.”  American Economic Review, 
 94(4): 1006-1030. 
 
Bound, J. and G. Johnson (1992) “Changes in the Structure of Wages in the 1980s: An  
  Evaluation of Alternative Explanations.” American Economic Review 82(3) 371-92. 
 
Broda, C. and J. Romalis (2008) “Welfare Implications of Rising Price Dispersion” 
 University of Chicago mimeo. 
 
Buera, J. and J. Kaboski (2009) “The Rise of the Service Economy.” Forthcoming American 
 Economic Review. 
 
Corden WM, Neary JP (1982). "Booming Sector and De-industrialisation in a Small Open 
 Economy". The Economic Journal 92 (December): 825–848. 
26 
 
Galor, O. and O. Moav (2000) “Ability-Biased Technological Transition, Wage Inequality, and 
 Economic Growth,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(2): 469-497. 
 
Harberger, A. (1962) “The Incidence of the Corporate Income Tax.” Journal of Political 
 Economy, 70(3):215-240. 
 
Jorgenson, D. (2001) “Information Technology and the U.S. Economy.” American Economic 
 Review, 91(1): 1-32. 
 
Jorgenson, D. and K. Stiroh (2000) "Raising the Speed Limit: U.S. Economic Growth in the 
  Information Age," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1: 125-236. 
 
Katz, L. and K. Murphy (1992) “Changes in Relative Wages: Supply and Demand Factors.” 
 Quarterly Journal of Economics 107:35-78. 
 
Krugman, P. (1987)  “The Narrow Moving Band, the Dutch Disease, and the Competitive 
 Consequences of Mrs. Thatcher.” Journal of Development Economics 27: 41-55. 
 
Krusell, P., Ohanian, L., Rios-Rull, J, and G. Violante (2000) “Capital-Skill Complemantarity 
 and Inequality: A Macroeconomic Analysis.” Econometrica 68, 1029-1053. 
 
Matsuyama, K. (2000) “A Ricardian Model with a Continuum of Goods under Nonhomothetic 
 Preferences: Demand Complementarities, Income Distribution, and North-South Trade.” 
 Journal of Political Economy 108(6): 1093-1120. 
 
Matsuyama, K. (2002)  “The Rise of Mass Consumption Societies,” Journal of Political 
 Economy 110: 1035-1070. 
 
Murphy, K., Schleifer, A., and R. Vishny (1989) “Income Distribution and Market Size, and 
 Industrialization.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 104: 537-64. 
 
Naito, H. (1999) “Re-examination of Uniform Commodita Taxes under a Nonlinear Income Tax 
  System and its Implication for Production Efficiency.” Journal of Public Economics 
 71:165-88. 
 
Ngai, R. and C. Pissarides (2007) “Structural Change in a Multi-Sector Model of Growth.” 
  American Economic Review, 97(1): 429-443. 
 
Ruggles, S., J.T. Alexander, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, M. Schroeder, and M. Sobek (2010),  
 “Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 5.0.”  University of Minnesota  
27 
 
 
Stiroh, K. (2002) “Information Technology and the Productivity Revival: What Do the Industry 
 Data Say?” American Economic Review, 92(5): 1559-1576. 
 
Triplett, J. and B. Bosworth (2000) “Productivity in the Services Sector.” The Brookings  
 Institution. Mimeo.  
 
Zweimuller, J. (2000) “Schumpterian Entrepreneurs Meet Engel’s Law: The Impact of Inequality 
 on Innovation-Driven Growth.” Journal of Economic Growth 5:185-206.  
 
 
 
Appendix A 
Proof of Proposition 1:  Total differentiation of equations (1) through (6) yields 
𝐻𝐹� = − (𝜎𝑌 − 1)(𝜎𝐹𝐿𝐹 + 𝐿𝑌)𝐻𝑌𝐻𝐹[(𝜎𝐹𝐿𝐹 + 𝜎𝑌𝐿𝑌)] + 𝐻𝑌[((𝜎𝐹 + 𝜎𝑌 − 1)𝐿𝐹 + 𝜎𝑌𝐿𝑌)] 𝑧𝑌� 
 
(A1) 
 
and 
𝐿𝐹� = (𝜎𝐹 − 1)(𝜎𝑌 − 1)𝜎𝑌𝐻𝑌𝐿𝑌 (𝜎𝐹𝐻𝐹 + 𝜎𝑌𝐻𝑌)  𝐿𝐹 (𝜎𝑌 − 1) + (𝜎𝐹𝐿𝐹 + 𝜎𝑌𝐿𝑌)(𝐻𝐹 + 𝜎𝑌𝐻𝑌) 𝑧𝑌�, 
 
(A2) 
 
where 𝑥� = 𝑑𝑥/𝑥 for any variable 𝑥.  Equation (A1) implies that 𝑑𝐻𝐹/𝑑𝑧 is negative if and only 
if 𝜎𝑌 > 1.  Assuming this is the case, (A2) implies that 𝑑𝐿𝐹/𝑑𝑧 is negative if and only if 𝜎𝐹 < 1.  
If we assume that the elasticity of substitution is greater than unity in both sectors, then an 
increase in 𝑧 will cause an outflow of skilled labor from the Potato sector and an inflow of 
unskilled labor.  We can determine the net effect on the supply of Potatoes by total 
differentiation of the Potato production function: 
𝑑𝐹
𝐹
 𝐹 𝜎𝐹𝜎𝐹−1 = 𝜂𝐾𝐹− 1𝜎𝐹𝑑𝐾𝐹 + (1 − 𝜂)𝐿𝐹− 1𝜎𝐹𝑑𝐿𝐹 . 
Substituting in (A1) and (A2) yields 
𝐹�  = −𝐹− 𝜎𝐹𝜎𝐹−1 � 𝜎𝑌𝐻𝑌𝐿(𝜎𝑌 − 1)(1 − 𝜂)𝐿𝐹− 1𝜎𝐹𝐿𝑌(𝜎𝐹𝐻𝐹 + 𝜎𝑌𝐻𝑌)  𝐿𝐹 (𝜎𝑌  − 1) + (𝜎𝐹𝐿𝐹 + 𝜎𝑌𝐿𝑌)(𝐻𝐹 + 𝜎𝑌𝐻𝑌)� × ?̂?, 
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which states that if 𝜎𝑌 > 1 the supply of Potatoes decreases whenever there is an improvement in 
skill-biased technological change in the Yacht sector. 
 
Appendix B 
Here we alter the model in Section 3 to allow production of Yachts and Potatoes to use a general 
constant-returns-to-scale functional form.  In the static competitive equilibrium consumers 
maximize utility subject to their budget constraints; firms maximize profits, and labor markets 
clear. The H Rich agents solve  max  𝑌𝑅              
s.t.  𝐻𝑤𝐻 = 𝑌𝑝𝑌 (B1) 
 
 Likewise, the Poor agents solve  max 1.5 × log(𝐹𝑃 + 1) 
s.t.    𝐿𝑤𝐿 = 𝐹𝑝𝐹 (B2) 
 
Prices of Potatoes and Yachts are equal to unit costs 𝑐𝐹 and 𝑐𝑌: 
 
𝑐𝐹(𝑤𝐻,𝑤𝐿) = 𝑝𝐹 (B3) 
𝑐𝑌 �
𝑤𝐻
𝑧
,𝑤𝐿� = 𝑝𝑌. (B4) 
Market clearing implies  
𝐻𝐹 + 𝐻𝑌 = 𝐻 (B5) 
𝐿𝐹 + 𝐿𝑌 = 𝐿. (B6) 
Shepard’s Lemma determines conditional factor demands in the Food sector: 
𝜕𝑐𝐹
𝜕𝑤𝐻
= 𝐻𝐹
𝐹
 
(B7) 
𝜕𝑐𝐹
𝜕𝑤𝐿
= 𝐿𝐹
𝐹
 (B8) 
and relative factor demands in the Yacht sector are derived setting marginal rates of technical 
substitution equal to the ratio of input prices: 
𝜕𝑌
𝜕𝐻
/ 𝜕𝑌
𝜕𝐿
 = 𝑟
𝑤
 (B9) 
Equations A1 through A9 characterize the equilibrium.  We can log-linearize the equilibrium 
equations to determine the effects of an increase in 𝑧 on all endogenous variables: 
𝑤𝐻� = 𝑌� + 𝑝𝑌� (B11) 
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𝑤𝐿� = 𝐹� + 𝑝𝐹� (B12) 
𝜙𝐻𝑤𝐻� + 𝜙𝐿𝑤𝐿� = 𝑝𝐹� (B13) 
𝜃𝐻𝑤𝐻� + 𝜃𝐿𝑤𝐿� = 𝜃𝑍?̂? + 𝑝𝑌� (B14) 
𝜆𝐻𝐹𝐻𝐹� + 𝜆𝐻𝑌𝐻𝑌� = 0 (B15) 
𝜆𝐿𝐹𝐿𝐹� + 𝜆𝐿𝑌𝐿𝑌� = 0 (B16) 
𝐻𝐹� = 𝐹� + 𝜙𝐻𝜎𝐹(𝑤𝐿� −𝑤𝐻� ) (B17) 
𝐿𝐹� = 𝐹� + 𝜙𝐿𝜎𝐹(𝑤𝐻� −𝑤𝐿�) (B18) 
𝐿𝑌� − 𝐻𝑌� + (𝜎𝑌 − 1)?̂? = 𝜎𝑌(𝑤𝐻� −𝑤𝐿�) (B19) 
 
For any variable 𝑥 above, 𝑥� = 𝑑𝑥
𝑥
.  We denote cost shares of labor in the Potato sector as 
𝜙𝐻 ≡ 𝑤𝐻𝐻𝐹/𝐹𝑝𝐹 and 𝜙𝐿 ≡ 𝑤𝐿𝐿𝐹/𝐹𝑝𝐹.  Likewise in the Yacht sector 𝜃𝐻 ≡ 𝑤𝐻𝐻𝑌/𝑌𝑝𝑌 and 
𝜃𝐿 ≡ 𝑤𝐿𝐿𝑌/𝑌𝑝𝑌.  The shares of labor types in each sector are 𝜆𝐻𝐹 = 𝐻𝐹𝐻 , 𝜆𝐻𝑌 = 𝐻𝑌𝐻 , 𝜆𝐿𝐹 = 𝐿𝐹𝐿 , 
and 𝜆𝐿𝑌 = 𝐿𝑌𝐿 .  The elasticity of substitution between the labor types is 𝜎𝐹 in the Potato sector.  In 
the Yacht sector 𝜎𝑌 in the elasticity of substitution between 𝑧𝐻 and 𝐿.  Solving the above system 
of equations yields the percentage change in Potatoes in response to a percentage increase in 
Yacht-specific, skill-biased technological change: 
𝐹� = − (𝜎𝑌 − 1)𝜆𝐻𝑌
�(1 + 𝜎𝐹)𝜆𝐻𝐹 + 𝜆𝐻𝑌 �𝜎𝑌𝜙𝐻 + 𝜆𝐿𝐹𝜆𝐿𝑌 �𝜎𝐹𝜙𝐿𝜙𝐻  − 1��� ?̂? 
Potato production will fall in response to an increase in 𝑧 whenever 𝜎𝑌 > 1 and 
 𝜎𝑌
𝜙𝐻
+ 𝜆𝐿𝐹
𝜆𝐿𝑌
�
𝜎𝐹𝜙𝐿
𝜙𝐻
 − 1� > 0.  This latter condition will hold when production functions are of the 
CES form as in Section 3. 
 
Appendix C 
Here we extend the model in Section 3 to include equipment capital, 𝐾.  Production of Potatoes 
and Yachts takes the nested CES form: 
𝐹 = �𝜂 �𝜆 𝐾𝐹𝜎𝐹−1𝜎𝐹 + (1 − 𝜆)𝐻𝐹𝜎𝐹−1𝜎𝐹 � 𝜎𝐹𝜎𝐹−1𝛽−1𝛽 + (1 − 𝜂)𝐿𝐹𝛽−1𝛽 �
𝛽
𝛽−1      
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𝑌 = �𝜇 �𝜆 (𝑧𝐾𝑌)𝜎𝑌−1𝜎𝑌 + (1 − 𝜆)𝐻𝑌𝜎𝑌−1𝜎𝑌 � 𝜎𝑌𝜎𝑌−1𝛾−1𝛾 + (1 − 𝜇)𝐿𝑌 𝛾−1𝛾 �
𝛾
𝛾−1,   
which is similar to the production function estimated by Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and 
Violante (2000).  The technology parameter, 𝑧, augments capital in the Yacht sector only.  
Alternatively, we could assume that capital is sector-specific, and that productivity 
improvements are unique to the production of capital used in the yacht sector.  With competitive 
markets the effects on factor demands and prices will be the same; the only difference is that 
capital in the Yacht sector would be measured as 𝑧𝐾𝑌instead of 𝐾𝑌.  Krusell et al. implicitly 
assume that the unit of measurement of capital is 𝑧𝐾 (theirs is a one-sector model) in order to 
account for the fall in the price of equipment capital during the latter part of the Twentieth 
Century.  However, this assumption is not necessary: in the calibrated general equilibrium model 
the price of 𝐾 (and the price of 𝑧𝐾𝑌) can fall in response to an increase in 𝑧, as we demonstrate 
below.   
Preferences are the same as in the baseline model, and we assume that the Rich own the 
economy’s endowment of capital 𝐾 in addition to high-skilled labor 𝐻.  The representative Rich 
agent therefore solves  max  𝑌 s.t.     𝑟𝐾 + 𝑤𝐻𝐻 ≥ 𝑟𝐾𝑌 + 𝑤𝐻𝐻𝑌 + 𝑤𝐿𝐿𝑌  (C1) 
 
and the Poor agent solves max   . 5 × log(𝐹) s.t.       𝑤𝐿𝐿 ≥ 𝑟𝐾𝐹 + 𝑤𝐻𝐻𝐹 + 𝑤𝐿𝐿𝐹, (C2) 
where 𝑟 is the price of capital. 
 In the competitive equilibrium the marginal rates of technical substitution must equal 
input prices.  This consists of two equations in the Yacht sector, 
𝜇1 − 𝜇 𝜆 𝑧𝜎𝑌−1𝜎𝑌 �𝜆 (𝑧𝐾𝑌)𝜎𝑌−1𝜎𝑌 + (1 − 𝜆)𝐻𝑌𝜎𝑌−1𝜎𝑌 � 𝛾−𝜎𝛾(𝜎−1)  𝐿𝑌1𝛾𝐾𝑌− 1𝜎𝑌 = 𝑟𝑤𝐿  (C3) 
and 
 
𝜇1 − 𝜇  (1 − 𝜆)𝑧𝛾−1𝛾 �𝜆 (𝑧𝐾𝑌)𝜎𝑌−1𝜎𝑌 + (1 − 𝜆)𝐻𝑌𝜎𝑌−1𝜎𝑌 � 𝛾−𝜎𝛾(𝜎−1) 𝐿𝑌1𝛾𝐻𝑌− 1𝜎𝑌 = 𝑤𝐻𝑤𝐿 , (C4) 
 
and two equations in the Food sector, 
 𝜂1 − 𝜂 𝜆 �𝜆 𝐾𝐹𝜎𝐹−1𝜎𝐹 + (1 − 𝜆)𝐻𝐹𝜎𝐹−1𝜎𝐹 � 𝛽−𝜎𝛽(𝜎−1) 𝐿𝐹1𝛽  𝐾𝐹− 1𝜎𝐹 = 𝑟𝑤𝐿  (C5) 
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and 
 
𝜂1 − 𝜂 (1 − 𝜆)�𝜆 𝐾𝐹𝜎𝐹−1𝜎𝐹 + (1 − 𝜆)𝐻𝐹𝜎𝐹−1𝜎𝐹 � 𝛽−𝜎𝛽(𝜎−1) 𝐿𝐹1𝛽  𝐻𝐹− 1𝜎𝐹 = 𝑤𝐻𝑤𝐿 .  (C6) 
Equations (C1) through (C6), in addition to market clearing conditions 
𝐾 = 𝐾𝐹 + 𝐾𝑌, 𝐻 = 𝐻𝐹 + 𝐻𝑌,      𝐿 = 𝐿𝐹 + 𝐿𝑌 , (C7-C9) 
fully characterize the competitive equilibrium. 
 We calibrate the model using the parameter estimates in Krusell et al (2000): 
𝛽 = 𝛾 = 1.67, 𝜎𝑌 = 𝜎𝐹 = 0.67, 𝜆 = 0.553,     𝜂 = 0.587. 
  As in section 3, we set 𝐻
𝐿
= .7 to match its value in 2000.  We set 𝜇 = 0.65 instead of 0.587 to 
help match the 2000 skill premium, 𝑤𝐻
𝑤𝐿
= 2.1, and because a higher value of 𝜇 increases the 
relative skill intensity in the Yacht sector, consistent with the evidence in Buera and Kaboski 
(2009).  The capital stock, 𝐾 = 7, is chosen to match the skill premium.  The starting value for 𝑧 
is 1.   
Table C1 shows the response of endogenous variables to a 10% increase in 𝑧.  The supply 
of Potatoes, 𝐹, falls by 0.43%, due entirely to an outflow of skilled labor.  Unskilled labor and 
capital actually flow into the Potato sector.  When 𝑧 increases, the technology-capital bundle 𝑧𝐾𝑌 
increases in the Yacht sector. Since 𝑧𝐾𝑌 and 𝐻𝑌 are relative complements (determined by the 
magnitude of 𝜎𝑌 relative to 𝛾), the Rich demand more skilled labor in the Yacht sector, which 
increases 𝑤𝐻 and 𝐻𝑌.  The Rich also demand less capital because the level of 𝑧𝐾𝑌 is high relative 
to 𝐻𝑌, which lowers the price of capital. The result is an outflow of capital from the Yacht sector 
and into the Potato sector.  The stronger the relative complementarity between capital and skill, 
the stronger is the fall in 𝑟 and in inflow of capital to the Potato sector.  If we change our 
baseline calibration slightly to decrease the relative complementarity (through either an increase 
in 𝜎𝑌 or a decrease in 𝛾), the sign of the change in 𝑟 ,𝐾𝐹 , or both can reverse.  All other variable 
changes are robust to a wide range of parameter values. 
 
Table C3: Response of Endogenous Variables to a 10% Increase in z 
𝑤𝐻�  
 
?̂? 
 
𝐾𝐹�  
 
𝐻𝐹�  
 
𝐿𝐹� 
 
𝐹� 
 
𝑌� 
1.59%   -1.70%   0.51%   -1.45%   0.29%   -0.43%   2.07% 
Note: The price of low-skilled labor, 𝑤𝐿 , is normalized to 1. 
 
